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Domestic Violence and Title III of the Violence 
Against Women Act of 1993: A Feminist Critique 
Birgit Schmidt am Busch * 
Rights of a Battered Woman 
I have the right not to be abused. 
I have the right to anger over past beatings. 
I have the right to choose to change the situation. 
I have the right to freedom from fear of abuse. 
I have the right to request and expect assistance from police and 
social agencies. 
I have the right to share my feelings and not be isolated from 
others. 
I have the right to want a better role model of communication for 
my children. 
I have the right to leave the battering environment. 
I have the right to privacy. 
I have the right to express my own thoughts and feelings. 
I have the right to develop my individual talents and abilities. 
I have the right to legally prosecute the abusing person. 
I have the right to be and I have the right to be me. 
Charlotte Feddersl 
• Dr. Jur. , University of Munich; LL.M. in International and Comparative Law, 
University of Iowa College of Law (August 1993). I would like to thank: Professor Martha 
Chamallas and Professor Linda Kerber and the participants of the Feminist Legal Harm-
workshop at the University of Iowa College of Law for their valuable assistance in the 
preparation of this article. Also, I wish to acknowledge with gratitude the help received 
from Professor Linda McGuire, Deb Bjornstad, LL.M. and Ulrike Bumke. 
1. Former victim. See Women and Violence: Hearings on S. 2754 Before the Senate 
Comm. on the Judiciary on Legislation to Reduce the Growing Problem of Violent Crime 
Against Women, IOIst Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 96 (1990) [hereinafter December Hearing] 
(statement of Charlotte Fedders). 
HASTINGS WOMEN'S LAW JOURNAL 
2 HASTINGS WOMEN'S LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 6:1 
Introduction 
A. A STORy2 
Peggy married Mike in 1974 and she and her two daughters from a 
previous marriage moved in with him. Early in the marriage Mike started 
hitting and kicking Peggy. After the first year of marriage, Peggy showed 
severe psychological problems and as a result was hospitalized and 
diagnosed as having symptoms of paranoid schizophrenia, but was soon 
released after responding to treatment. It then appeared to the daughters 
that Mike was encouraging Peggy to take more than her prescribed dosage 
of medication. 
In 1978, Mike began to taunt Peggy, stating that her 12-year-old 
daughter Carla was "more of a wife" to him than Peggy. When two social 
workers informed Peggy that they had received reports that Mike was 
abusing her daughters, Peggy eventually quit her job in order to prevent her 
husband from being alone with the two girls. Later, Carla was placed in 
a detention center, and Mike stopped Peggy and her other daughter Laura 
from visiting her. When Mike finally allowed his stepdaughter Carla to 
return home, he forced her to do all the housework and forbade Peggy and 
Laura to speak with her. When Peggy begged to be allowed to talk to 
Carla, Mike threatened her with a shotgun. As the situation with Carla 
escalated, so did Mike's violence toward his wife. He once kicked her so 
violently in the chest that she needed medical treatment. Finally one night, 
Mike threw Carla out of the house and forbade Peggy to contact Carla or 
even talk about her. 
When Laura eventually left the house, as well, Peggy became even 
more isolated. Once when Peggy was working at a cafe, Mike showed up 
with a gun and forced all the customers to leave because he wanted Peggy 
to come home with him immediately and have sex. Another time, Mike 
shot one of Peggy's pet cats, then turned the gun on her and threatened to 
pull the trigger. 
In May 1986, Peggy tried to leave and ran away to her daughter 
Laura's home. Her daughter had her hospitalized because she was suicidal. 
But, Mike checked her out of the hospital telling the hospital staff that he 
"needed his housekeeper." He threatened to kill her if she ever ran away 
again. As soon-as they arrived home, he repeatedly forced her to have oral 
sex with him. The following day Mike's parents came to visit them. 
According to his parents, Peggy and Mike were affectionate with each other 
2. This story is taken from a real case. See State v. Peggy Stewart, 763 P.2d 572 (Kans. 
1988). 
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during the entire visit. Later, after his parents had gone, Mike forced his 
wife to perform oral sex. 
B. SPOUSAL ABUSE - A LEGAL HARM? 
Peggy's story is far from unusual. In the United States alone more 
than 1.1 million women every year are victims of reported domestic 
violence. As many as 3 million more domestic violence crimes go 
unreported every year.3 Women are at risk in their homes. If they choose 
to go to the police or other authorities, they are often treated with ridicule 
and disbelief. The victims are blamed and seen as having provoked the 
outburst of violence by their partners.4 The police, prosecutors and the 
court system contribute to the problems of domestic violence by treating it 
essentially as a "personal problem."s Battered women often remain, 
feeling trapped; they are reluctant to leave their partners knowing that they 
might not find jobs or housing or because of guilt for the children. Many 
still believe that the partner will change.6 Quite often, battered women are 
in fact trapped, kept from leaving by threats of further violence or death if 
they attempt to leave their abusers. 
Spousal abuse is not new. Two centuries ago, in his Commentaries on 
the Laws of England, William Blackstone described the husband's right to 
moderately chastise his wife in order to enforce obedience to his lawful 
command.7 The common law criterion for measuring moderate chastise-
ment, the "rule of thumb," permitted a husband to discipline his wife by 
beating her, so long as the stick he used was no thicker than his thumb. 
That legal response reflected society's acceptance of wife-beating as a 
lawful and perhaps desirable, or at least necessary practice.s Violence has 
always been directed towards women and children, but the first family 
violence agencies in the late nineteenth century focused mainly on child 
abuse; the movement against cruelty to children was highly influenced by 
the temperance movement and blamed drinking for almost all family 
problems.9 Not until the Progressive Era was wife-beating considered a 
form of family violence. The prevailing view was that wife-beating 
3. 139 CONGo REc. S345 (357) (daily ed. Jan. 21, 1993) (statement of Sen. Kennedy). 
4. See SUSAN SCHECHTER, WOMEN AND MALE VIOLENCE 20-27 (1982). 
5. Id. at 158 (quoting James Bannon, Commander of the Detroit Police Department). 
6. See Lenore E. Walker, Battered Women and Learned Helplessness, 2 VICTIMOLOGY: 
AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL 525, 530 (1977-78); see also SCHECHTER, supra note 4, at 
26. 
7. WILLIAM B. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND, 432/433 
(1765). 
8. LEONARD KARP & CHERYL L. KARP, DOMESTIC TORTS: FAMILY VIOLENCE, 
CONFLICT AND SEXUAL ABUSE 5 (1989). 
9. LINDA GoRDON, HEROES OF THEIR OWN LIVES; THE POLITICS AND HISTORY OF 
FAMILY VIOLENCE (Boston 1880-1960) 6, 254-257 (1988). 
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resulted from environmental stress, lack of education, or lack of mental 
hygiene. 10 During the Depression, male violence was radically de-
emphasized as a grave family problem. In fact, society sympathized with 
the poor unemployed husband. Violence was excused as an unfortunate 
result of stressful circumstances. In these times of economic hardship, 
women were expected to make sacrifices and reconcile with their hus-
bands. II In the 1940s and 1950s wife-beating was perceived as an 
interpersonal problem. Because of the psychiatric influence in family-
violence work, women were blamed for their abuse by their husbands. 
Abused women were considered to be neurotic: they had failed to accept 
their own femininity; they were frustrated as the result of their frigidity. 
As a result they were deemed to need professional help. 12 
The feminist movement in the 1960s and 1970s "rediscovered" spousal 
abuse. 13 This movement challenged the ideology of public and private 
sphere and raised critical questions about "family values." Self-help 
organizations gained importance and the first shelter houses were 
founded. 14 
As the battered women's movement grew, the federal government, 
although reluctantly, responded to the problem of domestic violence. 
During the Carter Administration, various offices were set up to serve as 
central agencies for policy planning, information, dissemination and 
interagency coordination. IS However, it was not until some twenty years 
later, in 1990, that a federal bill was introduced in Congress that contained 
the first federal legislation against spousal abuse. 16 The Judiciary 
Committee held three hearings on S. 2754 during the 101st Congress; the 
third hearing, held on December 11, 1990, concentrated on crimes of 
domestic violence. I7 The bill did not come to the floor before the close 
of the 101st Congress; Senator Joseph Biden reintroduced a similar bill, S. 
15, on January 14, 1991. Shortly after, then Representative Barbara Boxer 
introduced a companion bill, H.R. 1502, in the House of Representatives. 
During the 102d Congress, the Judiciary Committee held another hearing 
on S. 15 on April 9, 1991, which focused on the bill's civil rights remedy 
10. Id. at 21-22. 
11. Id. at 22-23. 
12. Id. at 23, 270. 
13. SCHECHTER, supra note 4, at 192. 
14. GoRDON, supra note 9, at 25; SCHECHTER, supra note 4, at 53-79. 
15. The central agencies were the Interdepartmental Committee on Domestic Violence 
and the Office on Domestic Violence. With the election of President Reagan, the Office 
on Domestic Violence was dismantled and all the funding for regional technical assistance 
withdrawn. For more details see SCHECHTER, supra note 4, at 192-195. See also Elizabeth 
M. Schneider, The Violence of Privacy, 23 CONN. L. REv. 973, 980 (1991). 
16. S. 2754, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990). 
17. December Hearing. supra note 1. 
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for gender-motivated crime. I8 After several amendments the bill was 
reported favorably out of committee, but again was not acted upon in the 
102d Congress. I9 On January 21, 1993, Senator Biden, with the support 
of forty-three other senators, reintroduced the Violence Against Women Act 
of 1993.20 The bill also has the support of President Clinton who pledged 
to sign it during his election campaign.21 
Title II of the 1993 Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) recognizes 
that domestic violence is a national issue: for example, the bill declares that 
it is a federal crime for an abuser to follow his spouse across state lines and 
continue to abuse22 or violate a stay-away order.23 It protects women 
who flee their abusers by making protective court orders issued by one 
state valid in the forty-nine other states so that women do not lose 
protection if they happen to cross state lines.24 But this title contains 
other provisions as well: it encourages arrest policies by granting funds to 
the states for implementing pro-arrest programs and policies;25 it triples 
funding to shelter abused women;26 it provides educational programs in 
which young people are taught about domestic violence and violence 
among intimate partners;27 it secures the confidentiality of domestic 
shelters and abused persons' addresses;28 it provides for cooperation with 
local domestic violence programs;29 and provides for research and data 
collection on this issue.3o In its latest version the bill now also provides 
federal funds for a national domestic violence hotline; this national, toll-free 
telephone hotline is designed to provide information and assistance to 
victims of domestic violence.31 Former drafts authorized national media 
campaigns against spousal abuse, but these provisions were dropped in the 
1993 Bill. 
Furthermore, the bill would create a civil rights cause of action for the 
victims of gender-based violence. Title ill of the Act allows women to 
18. Violence Against Women: Victims of the System: Hearings on S. 15 Before the Senate 
Judiciary Comm. on A Bill To Combat Violence and Crimes Against Women on the Streets 
and in Homes, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (199]) [hereinafter April Hearing]. 
19. For the legislative history see S. REp. No. 197, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 35-36 (1991). 
20. S. 11, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). For full text see 139 CONGo REc. S345 (346-
357). 
21. THE PLAIN DEALER, Jan. 24, 1993, at 1 C. 
22. S. 11, 103d Cong., 1 st Sess. § 221 (1993). 
23. Id. 
24. Id. 
25. Id., § 231. 
26. Id., § 241. 
27. Id., § 261. 
28. Id., § 271. 
29. Id., § 281. 
30. Id., § 291. 
31. Id.,§211. 
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vindicate their right to be free of gender-based violence through a civil suit 
for monetary or other relief. Thus, Congress recognizes that the current 
civil rights legislation fails to address the problem of violent gender-based 
discrimination. Congress has already provided civil remedies for victims 
of race-based violence,32 and in 1964 Congress provided civil rights 
remedies for victims of sex discrimination in the workplace,33 but these 
statutes leave women unprotected against most gender-motivated crimes.34 
The creation of a federal civil rights cause of action for victims of gender-
motivated violence would play a significant role in recognizing violence 
against women as a compensable form of discrimination. Civil rights 
litigation has often served as an effective tool, sending a clear message to 
the public that violence against women will no longer be tolerated.35 This 
Article argues, however, that Title ill of the Violence Against Women Act, 
in its present form as amended by the l03d Congress,36 will not be an 
effective response to problems of domestic violence.37 Part I briefly 
introduces Title ill and its goals. Part II then demonstrates the weaknesses 
of Title III in its present form with respect to domestic violence. First, 
Title III does not address all forms of abuse present in domestic violence 
cases. In addition, the bill does not acknowledge that most acts of violence 
against women in their homes are gender-motivated. Lastly, Part III 
suggests ways to ensure the effective application of Title ill in cases of 
spousal abuse. 
I. Title III of the Violence Against Women Act 
- its Goals and Provisions -
Title III of the Violence Against Women Act would allow victims of 
gender-based crimes to bring a federal civil action against their attacker. 
The conduct covered under this section includes any crime of violence 
motivated by gender as defined in Title III. Compensatory and punitive 
damages, where appropriate, may be recovered along with other relief. 
32. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, 1985(3) (1988). 
33. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(I) (1988). 
34. S. REp. No. 197, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 42 (1991). See also Andrea Brenneke, Civil 
Rights Remedies for Battered Women: Axiomatic & Ignored, 11 LAW & INEQ. J. 1,44-52 
(1992); W. H. Hallock, The Violence against Women Act: Civil Rights for Sexual Assault 
Victims, 68 IND. L.J. 577, 592-595 (1993). 
35. See April Hearing, supra note 18, at 34 (testimony of Bonnie 1. Campbell, Att'y Gen. 
of Iowa). 
36. This Article looks at Title III in its version of May 1994. Title III had then been 
amended by the 103d Congress in two major ways by restricting crimes of violence to 
"felonies" and requiring "an animus based on the victim's gender." See infra. 
37. See also Brenneke, supra note 34, at 53. For a very critical analysis of Title III with 
regard to sexual assault, see Wendy Rae Willis, The Gun is Always Pointed: Sexual 
Violence and Title III of The Violence Against Women Act, 80 GEO. L.1. 2197 (1992). 
% ; 
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A. THE GOALS OF TITLE III 
In proposing a civil rights remedy for victims of gender-based crimes, 
supporters of the Act have stated three major goals. 
First, Title III is intended to influence the public's attitude about 
violence against women. An articulated objective of Title III is to 
communicate the message that violence based on gender violates women's 
civil rights and cannot just be perceived as a "family" problem, a "private" 
matter or a sexual "miscommunication."38 
Second, the bill is intended to bring the treatment of gender-motivated 
violence in line with that of other bias-motivated attacks. According to 
testimony at the Senate hearing, "[t]he Violence Against Women Act aims 
to put gender-motivated bias crimes against women on the same footing as 
other bias crimes. Whether the attack is motivated by racial, ethnic or 
gender bias, the results are often the same. The victims are reduced to 
symbols of group hatred which they have no individual power to change 
or escape. The violence not only wounds physically, it degrades and 
terrorizes, instilling fear and inhibiting the lives of all those similarly 
situated. ,,39 
Finally, Title III intends to provide federal remedies for victims of 
gender-motivated crime not presently available in state courts.40 The 
drafters found this necessary because the "combination of local prejudices, 
legal barriers, and legally recognized disbelief of women victims argues 
strongly for a Federal, not a State, remedy for gender-biased crimes. In an 
alternative Federal forum, antiquated State procedural rules are irrelevant 
and local immunities inapplicable. Damage questions will not revolve 
around the victim's 'sex life,' her dating history, or clothing, but the harm 
to her interest in equality .... Federal judges and juries are better insulated 
from the kind of local pressures that frequently put the victim, not the 
offender, on trial.'~l 
B. THE PROVISIONS OF TITLE 1II42 
Along with extensive findings about violence against women, Title 
rn43 contains four major subsections. 
38. S. REp. No. 197, t02d Cong., 1st Sess. 41 (1991). 
39. S. REp. No. 197, t02d Cong., 1st Sess. 43 (1991). 
40. S. REp. No. 197, t02d Cong., 1st Sess. 43-48 (1991). 
41. S. REp. No. 197, t02d Cong., 1st Sess. 48 (1991). 
42. See supra note 36 (version from May 1994). 
43. Since the language of the statute is gender-neutral, the Title III remedy is available 
to men as well as women whose civil rights are violated on the basis of gender. 
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Section 302 subsection (b) affirms that every person within the United 
States has the right to be free from crimes of violence motivated by gender. 
Subsection (c) defines the cause of action: 
A person (including a person who acts under color of any statute, 
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any State) who commits 
a crime of violence motivated by gender and thus deprives another 
of the right declared in subsection (b) shall be liable to the party 
injured, in an action for the recovery of compensatory and punitive 
damages, injunctive and declaratory relief, and such other relief as 
the court may deem appropriate. 
Subsection (d) defines "crime of violence motivated by gender:" A 
"crime of violence" is considered to mean an act or series of acts that 
would constitute a felony against the person or that would constitute a 
felony against property if the conduct presents a serious risk of physical 
injury to another, and that would come within the meaning of State or 
Federal offenses described in section 16 of Title 18, United States Code. 
Title 18 includes two possible categories of "crime of violence." The first 
is "an offense that has an element of use, attempted use, or threatened use 
of physical force against the person or property of another. ,*4 The second 
is "any other offense that is a felony and that, by its nature, involves a 
substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another 
may be used in the course of committing the offense.,,45 It is not 
necessary that the plaintiff has pursued a prior criminal action against the 
defendant. 
Such crime of violence is "motivated by gender," if it is "committed 
because of gender or on the basis of gender, and due, at least in part, to an 
animus based on the victim's gender." 
Finally, subsection (e) limits claims under Title III: 
Nothing in this section entitles a person to a cause of action under 
subsection (c) for random acts of violence unrelated to gender or 
for acts that cannot be demonstrated, by a preponderance of the 
evidence, to be motivated by gender (within the meaning of 
subsection (d)). 
Thus, Title ill differs from analogous federal statutes that provide civil 
remedies in cases of racially motivated violent assaults in two significant 
ways.46 First, Title III creates a remedy against violent gender-motivated 
44. 18 U.S.C. § 16(a). 
45. Id., § 16(b). 
46. For a detailed comparison between Title III and analogous existing federal statutes 
see April Hearing, supra note 18, at 91 (testimony of Burt Neubome, New York University 
School of Law). 
4&tL FE 
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assaults carried out by private individuals. Federal statutes like 18 U.S.C. 
§§ 241 and 242 and §§ 1983 and 1985 (3), dating from the post-Civil War 
Reconstruction period, provide relief against certain private "conspiracies" 
and unlawful actions by government officials, but do not provide relief 
against individual attackers. Title ill builds on the model of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 245,47 enacted in 1975, to provide relief against individuals. Thus, the 
drafters of Title III acknowledged that the majority of violent crimes 
against women are perpetrated by individuals.48 Second, unlike the 
existing federal statutes that provide remedies in cases of racially motivated 
crimes, Title ill is not merely a means to enforce the rights established by 
other provisions of law,49 but by itself creates a federal right to be free 
from gender-motivated violent assault and thus avoids confusion about what 
rights are protected. so 
II. Limited Applicability of Title III in Cases of Domestic 
Violence 
Title III of the Violence Against Women Act is a meaningful attempt 
to give victims of domestic violence a remedy for the gender-motivated 
element of their injury. However, by its definition of "crime of violence" 
and by requiring plaintiffs to prove the gender motivation of the violence, 
Title III will exclude many of the victims it hopes to assist.sl 
A. THE "CRIME OF VIOLENCE" REQUIREMENT 
By defining a "crime of violence" as an act or series of acts that would 
constitute a felony and would come within the meaning of State or Federal 
offenses described in section 16 of Title 18 of the United States Code, Title 
ill fails to effectively address all forms of abuse present in cases of 
47. 18 U.S.C. § 245 states in relevant part: 
[d. 
(b) Whoever, whether or not acting under color of law, by force or threat of 
force willfully injures, intimidates or interferes with, or attempts to injure, 
intimidate or interfere with . . . 
(2) any person because of his race, color, religion or national origin and 
because he is or has been (a list of protected activities follows), ... shall be 
fined .... 
48. See Hallock, supra note 34, at 595. 
49. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 241 which states: "If two or more persons conspire to injure 
... any citizen in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him 
by the Constitution or laws of the United States ... " 
50. See Brenneke, supra note 34, at 55. For an analysis of the shortcomings of the 
existing analogous federal statutes, see Tanya Kateri Hernandez, Bias Crimes: Unconscious 
Racism in the Prosecution of "Racially Motivated Violence", 99 YALE L.J. 845, 847-848 
(1990). 
51. See Brenneke, supra note 34, at 58. 
10 HASTINGS WOMEN'S LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 6: 1 
domestic violence. This narrow definition may jeopardize many women's 
use of the remedy in the context of domestic violence. 52 
1. Limited Application to Forms of Abuse Constituting Criminal 
Behavior 
The requirement in Title III that all civil rights deprivations motivated 
by gender be limited to occasion of "crimes" ignores that many forms of 
domestic abuse do not violate the criminal law. One ordinarily thinks of 
domestic abuse as the commission of a battery or an assault. 53 But this 
perception is too narrow. "[D]omestic violence is forceful, controlling 
behavior that coerces a woman to do what the abuser wants without regard 
to her rights, her body or her health. Battering is a pattern of behavior that 
includes the use or threat of violence for the purpose of gaining power and 
control over the victim. Abuse includes physical, psychological, sexual or 
economic violence inflicted upon the woman.,,54 Criminal law has proven 
to be inadequate to address these various forms of abuse since it is 
structured in a highly patriarchal way. 
Existing criminal law uses predominantly male standards to determine 
what behavior constitutes a crime and what does not. 55 Male concerns 
and interests have governed the definition of offenses. The interests 
presently protected under criminal law are predominantly male interests: the 
preservation of the state; property; life and physical safety. 56 Offenses 
protecting the state include contempt, causing a disturbance, public 
mischief, assaulting a police officer and riot and unlawful assembly -
offenses all of which work to deny women the opportunity to dissent and 
thus reinforce the subordinate status of women in society. 57 While 
traditional property interests are carefully protected, inadequate protection 
is provided for new property interests most important to women: access to 
the workforce; a safe, non-sexist work environment or protection from 
employment discrimination. 58 
52. In her analysis, W.H. Hallock does not seem to be aware of this problem. Hallock, 
supra note 34, at 603. 
53. Depending on the jurisdiction, the intentional bodily injury or offensive touching of 
another can constitute a battery or an assault. See ARNOLD H. LOEWY, CRIMINAL LAW IN 
A NUTSHELL 57 (1987). 
54. See December Hearing, supra note 1, at 139 (written statement by Susan Kelly-
Dreiss, Executive Director of the Pennsylvania Coalition Against Domestic Violence). For 
a more comprehensive description of domestic violence, see SCHECHTER, supra note 4, at 
11-20. Also see December Hearing, supra note 1, at 88, 99 (testimony of former victims 
Charlotte Fedders and Tracy Motuzick). 
55. CHRISTINE L.M. BOYLE ET AL., A FEMINIST REVIEW OF CRIMINAL LAW (1985). 
56. Id. at xviii. 
57. Id. at 7, 8. 
58. Id. at 8. 
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Finally, the many offenses protecting life and "physical" safety are 
inadequate to protect women from the more subtle forms of coercion59 
they suffer, such as sexual harassment, street harassment and economic 
abuse. By looking only at discrete acts, criminal law fails to address 
patterns of abuse. Thus, if a woman kills or harms her abuser while he is 
sleeping, the jury is not allowed to consider self-defense. Where self-
defense is asserted, the traditional view requires the showing of an 
imminent threat or a confrontational circumstance involving an overt act by 
an aggressor. Furthermore, it must be shown that a reasonable person in 
the defendant's circumstances would have perceived self-defense as 
necessary.6O Present law does not acknowledge that a woman who has 
been abused for years may reasonably perceive herself in danger when a 
man might not. The law only permits the jurors to focus on the facts 
immediately associated with the death to the exclusion of all the facts 
which make plausible the fear of the woman.61 
The effect of this patriarchal structure of criminal law is exemplified 
in domestic abuse cases. For example, Peggy would be left without 
remedies for most of the abusive behavior inflicted upon her by her 
husband. During their marriage, Mike not only kicked and hit Peggy, but 
he also terrorized her in many ways, which did not violate criminal law. 
For example, Mike humiliated his wife in front of other people by calling 
her his "housekeeper." He put her health at risk by encouraging her to take 
more than her prescribed dosage of medication. He tormented Peggy by 
throwing her daughter out of the house and forbidding her to contact her 
or even talk about her. Mike's abusive behavior forced Peggy to give up 
her job and stay at home and thus prevented her from pursuing a profes-
sional career. These forms of abuse would not necessarily fall within the 
scope of criminal law. 
The inadequacy of criminal law to protect women is seen, above all, in 
current rape laws.62 In some states, marital rape is still not considered a 
crime or demands proof of additional elements. F or example, most states 
still allow marital rape to be charged only where there is evidence of 
physical injury or where other requirements are met.63 In cases of both 
59. Id. at xxii. 
60. See State v. Stewart, supra note 2. 
61. Women are now developing a new definition of self-defense for battered women who 
kill, different from the legal precedents which focus on a man preserving his life. For more 
details see SCHECHTER, supra note 4, at 170-174; BOYLE, supra note 55, at 38-42. 
62. For a general critique with regard to rape see Willis, supra note 37. 
63. See Robin West, Equality Theory, Marital Rape and the Promise of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, 42 FLA. L. REv. 45, 46 (1990); Joan Zorza, The Criminal Law of Misdemeanor 
Domestic Violence, 1970-1990, 83 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 46, 50 (1992). For a 
comprehensive analysis of rape in marriage, see DIANE RUSSELL, RAPE IN MARRIAGE 
(1990); SUSAN ESTRICH, REAL RAPE (1987) . 
........................................... -.';-:' .. 
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marital and nonmarital rape, many states still require the prosecution to 
prove that the sexual contact was not only nonconsensual, but the product 
of force, before classifying forced sexual intercourse as criminal. 64 In 
these states, physical force is required primarily as evidentiary confirmation 
that the victim did not, in fact, consent to sexual contact. According to one 
judge "[t]he absence of consent necessarily implies resistance on the part 
of the female to preserve and protect her honor and the use of force on the 
part of the man to accomplish his purpose. The very nature of rape 
connotes forcible and unpermitted physical contact and an overt demonstra-
tion of resistance by the unwilling female.,,65 However, in abusive rela-
tionships, physical violence is at times not the way in which the man 
overcomes the woman's nonconsent to sex. Battered women, after years 
of physical and psychological terror, are so frightened and intimidated that 
they often succumb to pressure without the immediate threat of violence. 
Battered women will often think, "if I reassure him or if I make more of 
a commitment, then this will be OK, this will be better.,,66 In these cases, 
the forced sexual contact does not violate the criminal law and the woman 
would not be able to seek a remedy under Title III. 
2. Limited Application to Forms of Abuse Involving Physical Force 
or a Substantial Risk Thereof 
Even if the abuse constitutes criminal behavior, Title III only provides 
a remedy in cases containing the ''use, attempted use, or threatened use of 
physical force." This provides a gap for forms of abuse which would fall 
within the scope of criminal law, but may not necessarily involve the use 
or threatened use of physical violence. Thus, where a husband or a 
boyfriend prevents the woman from running away, by locking her in the 
home (Le., false imprisonment) but does not use or threaten to use physical 
force, Title ill would not apply. Theft and fraud would also be excluded. 
Where, as is common, the abuser takes his wife's money, leaving her 
without any financial resources, he could be charged with theft, but Title 
III would not provide a remedy for the victim. 
3. Limited Application to Forms of Abuse Constituting HFelonies" 
Finally, Title III limits the use of the remedy to victims of "felonious" 
crimes.67 However, where a lesser offense applies simply because of the 
64. See, e.g., Drake v. State, 236 S.E.2d 748, 749 (Ga. 1977) ('''Forcibly' and 'against 
her will' are not synonymous"). 
65. State v. Dizon, 390 P.2d 759, 764 (Haw. 1964). For a detailed analysis of the 
requirements in rape cases, see Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L.J. 1094-1132 (1986). 
66. See December Hearing, supra note 1, at 166 (testimony of Dr. Angela Browne, 
Department of Psychiatry, University of Massachusetts). 
67. The felony crime provision has only recently been included in Title III of the Senate 
VAWA. 
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relationship of the parties, Title III would apply if the crime would 
constitute a felony if it were between strangers.68 The felony requirement 
restricts the scope of the VA WA even further in the context of domestic 
violence because prosecutors bring misdemeanor charges for most 
crimes.69 Many forms of abuse - assault and battery - that women face 
in an abusive relationship would not be covered by the provisions of Title 
ill.70 
4. Conclusion 
F or the purposes of Title III of the Act, Congress should not define, as 
it has, "crime of violence" as a felony that comes within the meaning of 
section 16 of Title 18 of the United States Code. This unnecessarily limits 
the scope of behavior covered by the Act, and causes the scope of the Act 
to vary from state to state.7l The defendant is not facing criminal 
penalties for violating the bill. Since the bill is concerned with remedying 
the injury to the plaintiff, it contains a civil rather than criminal focus. 
Moreover, "because the bill comes under the auspices of civil rights, the 
remedy should be tied to the assault on the plaintiff's personal dignity and 
autonomy," not to criminal charges and the use of physical force.72 
Limitations on civil rights based on the categorization as a violent felony, 
serve to perpetuate violence motivated by gender. If Congress adopts Title 
ill in its present form, it will undermine the drafters' intent to provide 
remedies to victims who would be unable to press criminal charges in the 
state courts. 
B. THE REQUIREMENT OF "GENDER MOTIVATION" 
Title III requires the plaintiff to prove by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the crime was gender-motivated. A gender-motivated crime 
is defined as "a crime of violence committed because of gender or on the 
basis of gender; and due, at least in part, to an animus based on the 
victim's gender." Thus, while in a former draft it was sufficient to prove 
discriminatory motive, Title m in its latest version by including the animus 
mens rea additionally requires discriminatory intent. In essence, the 
remedy of Title III is limited to purposeful violent crimes against women. 
Furthermore, the requirement of proving discriminatory intent would pose 
a harmful burden on most battered women since they will have to 
overcome the cultural myths about woman battering. 
68. Title III subsection (2)(B). 
69. Brenneke, supra note 34, at 59. 
70. Id. at 64. 
71. Id. at 59. 
72. See Willis, supra note 37, at 2214. 
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1. Limited Application to "Intentional" Violent Sex Discrimination 
While earlier versions of Title ill permitted demonstration of discrimi-
natory motive, Title III has been amended by the I 03d Congress to 
additionally require that the crime is "due, at least in part, to an animus 
based on the victim's gender." In its amended form - and this seems to 
have been overlooked by the drafters - Title III requires proof of 
discriminatory intent and discriminatory motive, although the two standards 
partly exclude each other as controlling concepts: acts cannot be intentional 
and unconscious at the same time.73 Despite this technical problem, it is 
clear that intent is to be the gender-motivation standard. The intent 
standard was included to assure the critics that Title III will not be an over-
used provision. 
By requiring discriminatory intent, the application of Title III is limited 
to cases where the victim can demonstrate that her abuser intentionally 
engaged in the violent acts because of her sex. Thus, Title III largely 
misses the unconscious forms of violent discrimination against women in 
their homes.74 As has sufficiently been shown,75 existing stereotypes 
about family and women are the underlying cause for abusive behavior in 
intimate relationships. Many men still believe that a woman has to obey 
her husband's wishes and as a consequence consider themselves justified 
to use violence to exercise their control. The intent standard would fail to 
address civil rights deprivations coming from such stereotypes.76 In its 
present form Title ill would create a fault-based tort scheme rather than a 
remedy for violations of women's fundamental rights. 
2. The Problem of "Proving" Gender-Motivation 
Furthermore, the burden of demonstrating gender-motivation as defined 
in Title III would jeopardize the use of the remedy for many battered 
women. How would a battered woman establish that her abuser intention-
73. D. Don Welch, Removing Discriminatory Barriers: Basing Disparate Treatment 
Analysis on Motive Rather than Intent, 60 S. CAL. L. REv. 734 (1987), clearly delineates 
the nature and importance of the legal distinction between "motive" and "intent" in 
discrimination theory: While motive addresses the factors that lead into a decision, intent 
is the conscious purpose with which one acts to achieve a desired result. One's motive can 
be conscious or unconscious; the person mayor may not be aware of the reasons upon 
which he or she acts. Intent is conscious-the person knows what he or she intends. 
74. See also Brenneke, supra note 34, at 46. 
75. See, e.g., SCHECHTER, supra note 4, at 209. 
76. With respect to race-based deprivations of civil rights, many commentators have 
argued for the abandonment of the intent requirement in 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1982 in 
order to effectively address the subtlety and disguise of racial discrimination in today's 
society. See, e.g., Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: 
Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REv. 317 (1987). Welch, supra note 73, 
at 740, suggests waiving the intent requirement in Title VII disparate treatment cases. 
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ally engaged in abusive behavior because of her sex? Even if she were only 
required to show discriminatory motive, as required in former versions of 
Title III, the burden of proof would still be difficult.77 
The drafters of Title ill drew heavily upon the country's experience 
with race-based violence. The drafters envisioned the Title ill plaintiff's 
burden of demonstrating by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
assault was "motivated by gender" as being identical to the plaintiff's 
burden in a racially motivated assault case. The Committee report states: 
Proof of "gender-motivation" under title III should proceed in the 
same ways proof of race or sex discrimination proceeds under other 
civil rights law. Judges and juries will determine "motivation" 
from the "totality of the circumstances" surrounding the event. 
Consider existing law, which prohibits racially motivated attacks. 
In such cases, if a black civil rights worker is beaten by a Ku Klux 
Klan member who has been terrorizing a predominantly African-
American neighborhood, the chances are good that the attack is 
"motivated by racial bias." At trial, the victim's lawyers will prove 
all the circumstances showing the bias: that the victim was of one 
race (black) and the attacker from another (white); that the attacker 
does not typically assault white persons and has a history of 
assaulting black persons; that the attacker belonged to a white-
supremacist organization; and that the attacker shouted racial 
epithets during the assault. None of these circumstances taken 
individually would prove that the attack was racially motivated, but 
taken together they show racial bias.78 
Gender-motivated crimes should be viewed in precisely the same 
way. Consider the case of a serial rapist who violates his victims 
as he hurls misogynist slurs. The victim's lawyers would prove 
exactly the same type of "circumstances" that the lawyer in the 
"race" case proved: that the victim was of one sex (female) and the 
attacker a different sex (male); that the attacker did not kidnap and 
rape men, but had a long history of attacking women; and that the 
77. Hallock, supra note 34, at 611, argues that it is possible for a victim of spousal abuse 
to prove gender motivation. However, Hallock's potential scenario of domestic violence 
constitutes an unrealistically clear case: in her example a man with a prior history of 
abusing his girlfriends gets married and regularly beats up his wife during the marriage. In 
such a case, the courts surely will not find it difficult to conclude that the man's acts were 
gender-motivated. But her bias indicators would not apply in a case where a man who has 
no prior history of abusing women beats up his wife occasionally. Thus, Title III would 
give an effective remedy only to women who have been suffering from spousal abuse for 
years. Title III would fail to convey that any form of abuse, be it the first, the second or 
the hundredth time, deprives the woman of her right to be free from gender-motivated 
violence. 
78. S. REp. No. 197, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 50 (1991). 
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attacker shouted antiwoman epithets during the assault. Again, the 
jury might not be convinced by anyone of these circumstances 
individually - but all together show gender bias. 
In other words, the drafters of Title m consider the generally accepted 
guidelines for identifying hate crimes useful in assessing whether the 
circumstances show gender-motivation. Thus, they recommend the use of 
the following factors to determine whether a crime is gender related: 79 
language used by the perpetrator; the severity of the attack (including 
mutilation); the lack of provocation; previous history of similar incidents; 
absence of any other apparent motive (battery without robbery, for 
example); common sense (using common sense to detect indications of 
gender relatedness).80 
These characteristics will be useful in extreme cases of gender-
motivated crime. The testimony of Roland W. Burris, Attorney General, 
State of Illinois,81 clearly shows what cases the drafters - many of them 
men - had in mind: cases like the one in Montreal where a gunman 
walked into a university classroom screaming that feminists had ruined his 
life and proceeded to kill fourteen of the young women who were 
present. 82 Or like the incident in Berkeley, where a man walked into a 
campus bar, segregated the men from the women, and after abusing the 
women, shot and killed one of them.83 
However, in domestic violence cases the generally accepted guidelines 
for identifying hate crime will often not work. It is incorrect to assume 
that the situation of a battered woman is substantially similar to that of 
other hate crime victims. What makes wife abuse different from hate 
crimes based on religion, race, ethnicity or sexual identity is the intimacy 
of the relationship between the woman and her abuser. The battered 
woman is married to her abuser, she lives with him and in many cases they 
have children together. Because of the personal interaction and the daily 
contact, the woman will often not be able to prove that the violence was 
gender-motivated and not just a "family dispute." 
Again, Peggy's case can serve as an example. Mike's attorneys would 
probably argue that Peggy provoked the outburst of violence: She resisted 
having sex with him (implying that she might be frigid), she ran away and 
caused him to drive all the way from Kansas to Oklahoma to get her. She 
79. S. REp. No. 197, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 50 (n.72) (1991). The report refers to 
suggestions by Peter Finn, Bias en'me: A Special Target for Prosecutors, 21 THE 
PROSECUTOR 9, 13 (1987/88). 
80. For the same approach see April Hearing, supra note 18, at 57 (testimony of Bonnie 
J. Campbell, Att'y Gen., State of Iowa). 
81. See April Hearing, supra note 18, at 63. 
82. Id. 
83. Id. 
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suffered from severe psychological problems and was thus responsible for 
their marriage difficulties. Of course, Mike's parents and friends would 
testify that in their presence Peggy and Mike were very affectionate with 
each other. Finally, it would be no surprise if Mike's friends and 
colleagues testified that he was extremely nice to women and treated them 
with much respect. 
Although the language used by an abusive husband sometimes will be 
sex-based, abusers, typically, are normal in their relationships with other 
women. During the December hearing, .Charlotte Fedders testified: 
Five years ago when my life as a victim of violence in my home 
became public, people seemed so surprised that a man of my 
former husband's prominence could be guilty of physically or 
emotionally abusing his wife and children.84 
Leaving the burden of proof with the victim means that the battered woman 
has to overcome the stereotypes of judges and jurors that domestic violence 
is a "family dispute" or a "personal conflict." How can a married woman 
prove that her husband hates her not as an individual person, but as a 
woman? 
From this a telling analogy can be drawn between the problems women 
encountered in the early sexual harassment cases before the COurtS.85 The 
relationship between the woman and her employer was considered personal, 
the behavior of the man was individualized: "Mr. Price's conduct is nothing 
more than a personal proclivity, peculiarity, or mannerism.,,86 Sexual 
advances were conceived as advances toward an individual person. They 
were perceived as lacking the necessary group referent to come within the 
classification "based on sex.,,87 
3. Conclusion 
By requiring discriminatory intent and at the same time placing the 
burden of proof with the woman, Congress fails to recognize the specificity 
of the injury inflicted on battered women. Title ill of the Violence Against 
Women Act, in its present form, will only manifest the cultural myths 
about woman battering. These myths suggest that woman battering is a 
"crime of passion," that wife abuse is a private family affair, and that 
women who are battered "had it coming" because of some fault or error of 
84. See December Hearing, supra note 1, at 88 (testimony of Charlotte Fedders, fonner 
wife of John M. Fedders (fonner chainnan of the Securities and Exchange Commission». 
85. For a detailed critique of the first cases, see CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL 
HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN 83-90 (1979). 
86. Come and DeVane v. Bausch & Lomb, 390 F. Supp. 161, 163 (D.Ariz. 1975). 
87. MACKINNON, supra note 85, at 85. 
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their own.88 Congress aims at attacking the existing prejudices that view 
domestic violence as a personal affair, but by applying the same standards 
as in other hatelbias crimes, it will only perpetuate them.89 
III. Suggestions for Amendments to Ensure the Effective 
Application of Title III in Domestic Violence Cases 
Title III of the Violence Against Women Act as it exists now will not 
fully achieve its goals. However, it can be salvaged. By setting clear 
standards for the courts to apply, Congress could make significant progress 
toward changing societal conceptions of wife battering and rape and toward 
providing civil remedies for victims of domestic violence. This paper 
suggests the following amendments to Title III which could ensure its 
effective application in domestic violence cases. First, Title III should not 
be tied to federal and state criminal laws, but should itself define and 
enumerate the forms of abuse against women that it aims to address. 
Second, Title III should waive the intent requirement. With respect to 
"proving" gender-motivation it should contain a presumption that all forms 
of domestic violence are gender-motivated and provide for the defendant 
to rebut this presumption by proving that he acted in self-defense. 
A. FEMINIST DEFINITION OF VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 
Title III should not be tied to federal and state criminal laws which do 
not address all forms of abuses against women. Rather, it should list and 
define the sort of acts of violence it aims to prevent. 90 The first draft of 
88. See April Hearing, supra note 18, at 253 (written statement submitted to the Senate 
Judiciary Comm. by Leslie R. Wolfe, Executive Director, Center for Women Policy 
Studies). For a detailed analysis of the myths about wife abuse see SCHECHTER, supra note 
4, at 20-27. 
89. This problem was overlooked by Leslie R. Wolfe, Center for Women Policy Studies, 
in her Statement submitted to the Senate Judiciary Committee. She, on the one hand, 
suggested to apply the guidelines for identifying an act of violence as a hate crime to wife 
abuse, and, on the other hand, emphasized the uniqueness of the victim's situation because 
of her having an intimate relationship with her abuser. She even stated: "But as we have 
seen, hate crimes are usually defined as crimes perpetrated against an unknown victim who 
represents a hated "minority" group. Yet women are often victimized by close associates, 
close to home, as well as by hate-filled strangers," April Hearing, supra note 18, at 270. 
Yet she did not see that exactly because of this difference from other hate crime bias, the 
battered woman will often not be able to show the gender motivation of the violence. 
90. Not much would be gained by tying Title III to civil torts actions. It is true that many 
forms of abuse against women do not constitute criminal behavior, but would constitute a 
tort. Examples are tort actions for intentional infliction of emotional injury in situations of 
extreme misconduct that causes severe emotional distress, the tort of false arrest and 
imprisonment which protects the personal interest in freedom from restraint of movement 
and the tort of defamation protecting the interest in reputation and good name. For a 
detailed analysis of domestic torts see KARP & KARP, supra note 8, at 43-51. However, 
many forms of violence would still go unremedied. The tort action for intentional infliction 
of mental distress, for example, arises only in situations involving conduct which is "so 
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the Violence Against Women Act enumerated various abuses: "For 
purposes of this section, a 'crime of violence motivated by the victim's 
gender' means any rape, sexual assault or abusive sexual contact motivated 
by gender based animus.,,91 This language was later eliminated from the 
definition of a gender-motivated crime to avoid the negative implication 
that only these crimes would give rise to a cause of action under Title 
111.92 
This first version should be used and amended to include domestic 
abuse. In order to prevent Title ill from unconstitutional vagueness, Title 
III will need to include feminist definitions of the various forms of violence 
against women. While it is easy to define rape and other forms of sexual 
assault, it will be more difficult to come up with a workable definition of 
domestic violence. How can domestic violence be identified in an 
individual case? When does a relationship become abusive - after the first, 
after the fifth or after the tenth outburst of violence? 
As in the case of sexual harassment, where sexual harassment, the 
experience, became "sexual harassment", the legal claim,93 domestic 
violence can also develop into a legal harm. Family violence was 
perceived as a serious societal problem about twenty years ago.94 Since 
then, many studies have been done which reveal the dynamics of domestic 
violence.95 Simply stated, domestic abuse is a pattern of behavior that 
includes the use or threat of violence for the purpose of gaining power and 
control over the victim. Abuse includes physical, sexual, psychological and 
economic violence and violence toward objects or pets that belong to the 
abused person.96 Physical abuse involves the use of weapons, such as 
outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of 
decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community." 
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46(1) (1965). 
91. S. 2754, IOlst Cong., 1st Sess. (1990) (as introduced in the Senate in June 19, 1990, 
before being referred to the Senate Judiciary Committee). 
92. S. REp. No. 197, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 62 (1991). 
93. MACKINNON, supra note 85, at 25-100. 
94. Although it seems to have existed at all times. See supra. 
95. These studies include: RICHARD GELLES, THE VIOLENT HOME: A STUDY OF 
PHYSICAL AGGRESSION BETWEEN HUSBANDS AND WIVES (1972); RICHARD GELLES, 
F AMIL Y VIOLENCE (2d ed. 1987); RICHARD GELLES, INTIMATE VIOLENCE IN FAMILIES (2d 
ed. 1990); SUZANNE K. STEINMETZ, THE CYCLE OF VIOLENCE: ASSERTIVE, AGGRESSIVE 
AND ABUSIVE F AMIL Y INTERACTION ( 1977); MURRAY A. STRAUS, RICHARD GELLES & 
SUZANNE K. STEINMElZ, BEHIND CLOSED DooRS: VIOLENCE IN THE AMERICAN FAMILY 
WALKER (1980); ANGELA BROWNE, WHEN BATTERED WOMEN KILL (1987); LENORE 
WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN (1979); LENORE WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN 
SYNDROME (1984); R. EMERSON DOBASH & RUSSELL P. DoBASH, VIOLENCE AGAINST 
WIVES - A CASE AGAINST THE PATRIARCHY (1981). 
96. For a more detailed analysis of the following characteristics of domestic violence 
listed in the text, see MARY S. WINTERS, LAWS AGAINST SEXUAL AND DOMESTIC 
VIOLENCE 4-5 (1988). 
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guns and knives, and/or the abuser's body, such as hitting, spanking, 
choking, shoving, biting, slapping, and kicking. Sexual abuse is related to 
physical violence, but it has specifically sexual characteristics. Rape, for 
example, belongs in this category. Psychological abuse takes the form of 
verbal abuse, coercion, and threats; intimidation; public humiliation; being 
locked out of the house; being left without money or car keys; being 
refused help in cases of sickness, injury, or pregnancy. Any act or words 
that create a climate of fear and psychic pressure constitute psychological 
abuse. An accompanying behavior is often enforced isolation. The 
victim's freedom is restricted such that her ability to contact those who 
could help is reduced. Economic abuse includes actions such as hoarding 
and withholding family financial information from the abused. Destruction 
of the abused s pets or property by the abuser, finally, implies a threat to 
the victim and a devaluation of things meaningful to the victim. 
For purposes of Title III domestic violence should be defined as "acts 
by one partner of an intimate relationship against the other causing 
physical, sexual, or psychological damage committed with the intent to 
cause these damages.,,97 By referring to the abuser's intent this definition 
encompasses the above mentioned forms of abuse. It makes clear that there 
is no "scale" of violence, since violence cannot be accurately defined as 
"mild" or "severe." A "gentle" shove down the stairs can be fatal. 
Referring to "acts" permits consideration of the entire pattern of domestic 
abuse and excludes single incidents of violence which might occur in any 
relationship. Because women who are not legally married are also abused, 
the definition uses the term of "intimate relationship" instead of "marriage." 
It is the opinion of the author that including psychological damage in 
the definition is crucial in order to fully address issues of domestic violence 
which a male-oriented criminal law system has failed to address. Of 
course, for many given the traditional reluctance to intrude on family 
affairs, this definition will go too far. The opponents of a broad definition 
will argue that Title III in its suggested form can easily be misused (for 
example, in divorce cases) and that government intervention in cases of 
psychological abuse is not justified. However, the argument that Title ill 
in the form suggested by the author could be misused does not mean that 
it will in fact be misused. There is no reason to believe that women - any 
more than any other group - will file frivolous civil rights claims for 
ulterior purposes. Furthermore, psychological abuse is almost always part 
of a pattern that includes physical, sexual and economic abuse, so that it 
seems unlikely that the victim will seek a civil rights remedy only for 
psychological abuse. More importantly, it should be pointed out that it is 
the victim who decides when to initiate an action under Title III. She will 
97. Borrowed in part from KARP & KARP, supra note 8, at 6. 
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hardly be likely to do so in cases of minor psychological abuses since 
seeking a remedy under Title ITI means a significant sacrifice of privacy. 
Furthermore, Title ill in its suggested form would not criminalize 
psychological abuse, but would recognize it as a violation of civil rights -
therefore different standards apply. Distinct criteria apply in order to 
identify a person's behavior as discriminatory or as criminal. It should be 
noted that in sexual harassment cases, psychological abuse can be remedied 
under Title VII. In Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, the Supreme Court 
identified both quid pro quo harassment and hostile working environment 
as sex discrimination.98 The Court decided that Title VII grants employ-
ees the right to work in an environment free from discriminatory intimida-
tion, ridicule, and insult99 - in other words: free from psychological 
abuse. Thus, courts have recognized psychological abuse of women to 
constitute a form of sex discrimination. 
Nevertheless, in the alternative the author suggests including domestic 
violence in Title lIT by listing examples of physical, sexual and economic 
abuses experienced in abusive relationships (leaving out psychological 
abuses), while making clear that the given list is not exhaustive. Thus, 
Title ill would address forms of violence it so far fails to address, but at 
the same time have a limited scope. Including an illustrative list of forms 
of abuses would enable the courts to take into account the whole relation-
ship of the partners, including psychological harm. 
B. PRESUMPTION OF GENDER-MOTIVATION1OO 
Including a feminist definition of domestic violence, however, does not 
suffice. A burden shifting scheme should be created: "If the plaintiff can 
prove by a preponderance of evidence that she was the victim of domestic 
abuse as defined above, a rebuttable presumption should arise that the 
violence directed towards her was gender-motivated." As will be shown, 
domestic violence is gender-based according to both legal doctrines 
currently discussed in sex discrimination cases: the inequality approach and 
the differences approach. Thus, by proving that she was the victim of 
domestic violence, the plaintiff has proved prima facie that the violence 
inflicted upon her was gender-motivated. The defendant should be allowed 
to rebut the presumption by proving that he acted in self-defense. 101 
98. Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986). 
99. Id. at 65. 
100. This presumption has already been suggested with respect to rape by Willis, supra 
note 37, at 2221-22. 
101. For a burden shifting scheme in Title III, especially when a burden of proving intent 
to discriminate is imposed, see Brenneke, supra note 34, at 75. 
&& 
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1. Domestic Violence is Gender-Motivated 
Domestic violence is clearly gender-motivated, according to both the 
inequality approach and the differences approach. 102 Currently dominant 
in sex discrimination law, the differences approach is based on the 
assumption that equals should be treated equally. In the law, this has led 
to the formula that "similarly situated" persons should be treated the same, 
meaning that persons in "substantially similar circumstances should be 
treated the same."103 Less frequently adopted by the courts, the inequali-
ty approach centers upon the view that discrimination consists of the 
systematic disadvantagement of social groups. The view that sex 
discrimination is a system that defines women as inferior to men underlies 
this approach. I04 
a. An Inequality Argument 
Under the inequality approach, "practices which express and reinforce 
the social inequality of women" are perceived as gender-based. 105 
Domestic violence is clearly gender-based in this view. Women are abused 
by their partners because they are women. Domestic violence is a means 
to preserve male domination in the family. 
Throughout history, the laws and practices of the larger society 
supported the patriarchal family. Marriage laws explicitly recognized the 
family as the domain of the husband. 106 
To be a wife meant becoming the property of a husband, taking a 
secondary position in a marital hierarchy of power and worth, 
being legally and morally bound to obey the wishes and the will of 
one's husband, and thus quite logically subject to his control even 
to the point of physical chastisement or murder. 107 
Over the decades the laws changed when women demanded rights to 
divorce, separate, control their own property, and take custody of their 
children. Despite these breakthroughs violence persisted. Although men 
no longer legally "own" women, they use violence to exercise their control 
of them. Thus, violence reinforces women's subordinate status in the 
102. For a detailed description of the two doctrines, see MACKINNON, supra note 85, at 
101-18. 
103. Id. at 107. 
104. Id. at 116-17. 
105. Id. at 174. 
106. Brenneke, supra note 34, at 22. 
107. EMERSON R. DOBASH & RUSSELL DoBASH, VIOLENCE AGAINST WIVES: A CASE 
AGAINST THE PATRIARCHY 33 (1979). 
-
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family. Beating keeps women from leaving; it keeps them providing sexual 
services, housework and child care services. lOS 
b. A Differences Argument 
The basic question the differences approach suggests is: was the 
practice directed towards a woman or rather towards a person who just 
happens to be a woman? A practice is discriminatory if the answer is: "a 
man in her position would not have been so treated."I09 Under this 
approach, domestic violence is gender-based because spousal abuse 
disparately injures one gender-defined group in a sphere - intimate 
relationships - in which the treatment of men and women can be 
compared. Both men and women are involved in intimate relationships. 
But women, not men are disproportionately abused by their spouses. Since 
men are not abused and women are, unequal treatment by gender is 
demonstrated. 
Domestic violence disproportionately injures - in its primary meaning 
- women in the family.110 Acts of violence against women in their 
homes are not random, isolated acts, but rather are actions that are meant 
to intimidate and terrorize all women. The very pervasiveness of violence 
against women in their homes - reflected in available statistics 
documents that violence against women is a societal phenomenon: 
* Every 15 seconds a woman is beaten by her husband or boy-
friend. 
* Thirty percent of women who are homicide victims are killed by 
their husbands or boyfriends. 
* Each year, 4,000 women are killed in the context of domestic 
violence situations - by husbands or partners who have abused 
them. 
* One in four - 25 percent - of women who attempt suicide 
have been victims of family violence. lll 
"While 91 per cent of all violent crimes between spouses in 1982 were 
victimizations of women by husbands and ex-husbands, only 5 per cent 
were victimizations of husbands by wives or ex-wives.,,1l2 The statistics 
108. See SCHECHTER, supra note 4, at 216; DOBASH & DOBASH, supra note 107. See also 
GoROON, supra note 9, at 3, 251, 285-88, and Brenneke, supra note 34, at 11, 16. 
109. MACKINNON, supra note 85, at 192. 
110. See Brenneke, supra note 34, at 6. 
111. For the following statistics see April Hearing, supra note 18, at 259 (written 
Statement submitted to the Senate Judiciary Comm. by Leslie R. Wolfe, Executive Director, 
Center for Women Policy Studies). Similar statistics were presented by the Majority Staff 
of the Senate Judiciary Comm., Violence Against Women: A Week in the Life of America, 
Oct. 1992, at 49-55. 
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clearly convey that family violence is directed toward a specific class of 
people - women. 
The structure of today's society explains the prevalence of males as 
abusers and females as victims. I13 Battering is supported by the belief 
that the father is the head of the family. The disproportionate degree to 
which women are objectified in society is another factor. The increasing 
use of pornography and the use of women's bodies to sell products, from 
cars to charge cards, reinforce the abuser's perception of women as 
property or subhuman. The ability of men to control women's education 
and employment further facilitates the use of violence against women. 
Women are financially unable to provide for themselves and the children 
without the abuser. These so-called cultural facilitators: the belief in a 
natural order of power within families, the objectification of women and the 
economic power of men - explain the disproportionate number of victims 
and indicate that family violence is overwhelmingly gender-motivated. 
In domestic violence cases, a woman would not have been abused had 
she been a man. This argument can be made despite the fact that in many 
cases violence is also directed towards the children, both girls and 
boyS.II4 In many of these cases, the father turns to the children to 
terrorize his wife. Mike, for example, taunted Peggy by stating that 12-
year-old Carla was "more of a wife" to him than Peggy. Carla can be 
assumed to be the victim of incestuous abuse. The most common type of 
incestuous abuse is father-daughter incest. lIS Statistics show that girls are 
more often the victims of child abuse than boys. 
2. Rebuttable Presumption 
To overcome the difficulties of proving gender bias, the author suggests 
that if the plaintiff can prove by a preponderance of evidence that she was 
the victim of domestic abuse as defined above, a rebuttable presumption 
would arise that the violence directed toward her was gender-motivated. 
Such a presumption is justified even in cases where the defendant can 
articulate specific motivations for his use of violence. "I beat her up 
because dinner was not ready when I came home. I was furious." Under 
Title III in its suggested form, it would not be necessary to prove that 
gender was the sole motivating factor. With respect to employment 
113. For a detailed analysis of the "so-called cultural facilitators of battering", see ELLEN 
PENCE, MADELINE DUPREY, MICHAEL PAYMAR & CORAL McDoNNELL, THE JUSTICE 
SYSTEM'S RESPONSE TO DOMESTIC ASSAULT CASES: A GUIDE FOR POLICY DEVELOPMENT 
at 1-8 (Publication by the Minnesota Program Development, Inc., Domestic Abuse Interven-
tion Project in Duluth, Minnesota 1985). See also Brenneke, supra note 34, at 12. 
114. Unfortunately, the correlation between wife beating and child abuse awaits further 
research. But from existing statistics, it appears that only about 40% of wife-beaters are 
also child abusers. See, e.g., GoRDON, supra note 9, at 261. 
115. KARP & KARP, supra note 8, at 162. 
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discrimination cases, Title Vll now contains a provision explicitly stating 
that an employment practice is unlawful if sex was a motivating factor for 
that practice even though other factors also motivated the practice. 116 
This principle should also be applied in Title III cases. 1I7 Whatever 
motivations the defendant puts forward, as was shown above, gender per 
se is a relevant factor in abusive relationships. Applying the standard of 
Title VII, a woman who has proven domestic abuse has also proven that 
the violence was gender-motivated. 118 
The burden should then shift to the defendant to prove that his 
particular act of violence was not motivated by gender. Since motivation 
is an issue of fact peculiarly within the knowledge of the defendant, 
shifting the burden of proof to him gives him a powerful incentive to 
divulge as much relevant information as possible. 
The presumption of gender motivation recognizes the experience and 
psychology of both victims and perpetrators. At the same time, it gives the 
defendant an opportunity to rebut the presumption if his case was an 
exception from the norm. Title ill should not provide a plaintiff with a 
remedy if the abuse inflicted by the defendant was done in self-defense. 
Since it happens that women out of fear sometimes attack their abusers 
before they are attacked, the defendant must be allowed to rebut the 
presumption in such cases. 
Conclusion 
Domestic violence is a serious societal problem. Congress' attempt to 
create a civil rights remedy for victims of family violence attests to the 
seriousness of this problem. By recognizing and providing legal remedies 
for a harm which has long been present in our society, Congress is 
attempting to accomplish with the Violence Against Women Act what has 
already been achieved in the area of sexual harassment. Harms which 
116. 7 U.S.c. § 2000e-2(m) states: "Except as otherwise provided in this subchapter, an 
unlawful employment practice is established when the complaining party demonstrates that 
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any employment 
practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice." 
117. See also Brenneke, supra note 34, at 77. 
118. Brenneke, supra note 34, at 94, suggests an interesting but hardly practicable three-
tier, victim-oriented approach. She proposes to provide three alternative ways of proving a 
prima facie case, electable by the plaintiff and arguable in the alternative. The first alterna-
tive would create a presumption of gender-motivation for certain acts of violence occurring 
in an abusive relationship. The second alternative would allow a rebuttable presumption for 
crimes which have, as an element, the actual, attempted, or threatened use of physical force 
against a person. Finally, the third approach would incorporate an individualized, victim-
perspective standard. The claimant would be permitted to admit evidence that the conduct 
created, in the totality of the circumstances judged from her perspective, a threat of physical 
injury. 
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society has chosen to ignore are finally being addressed by the legal 
system. 
Unfortunately, in its present form, the Violence Against Women Act 
fails to meet its educational and remedial goals. By referring to patriarchal 
federal and state criminal laws, and by requiring victims to prove gender-
motivation, the bill fails to recognize that violence against women in their 
homes is gender-motivated and reflects societal misogynist attitudes. Many 
victims of domestic violence will not find relief under the Act. This is 
especially true for the latest version of Title III as amended by the 103d 
Congress. 
In order to ensure the effective application of Title III, its provisions 
should be amended in two ways. First, a definition of domestic violence 
should be included which encompasses not only physical, but also sexual, 
economic and psychological forms of abuses. Second, if the plaintiff 
proves that she was the victim of a form of domestic violence by her 
partner, a rebuttable presumption should arise that the acts of violence 
directed against her were gender-motivated. The defendant should be 
allowed to rebut the presumption by showing that the particular act was not 
gender-motivated. 
If Congress adopts these proposals, Title III of the Violence Against 
Women Act will create real remedies for Peggy and other battered women. 
Thus, Congress would send a strong message that violence against women 
is a civil rights violation and will not go unheeded. As one former victim 
has said: "I have the right to be and I have the right to be me." 
